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Abstract
The Kochen-Specker theorem is one of the fundamental no-go theorems in
quantum theory. It has far-reaching consequences for all attempts trying
to give an interpretation of the quantum formalism. In this work, we
examine the hypotheses that, at the ontological level, lead to the Kochen-
Specker contradiction. We emphasize the role of the assumptions about
identity and distinguishability of quantum objects in the argument.
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1 Introduction
One of the goals of physics is to predict a physical system’s future behavior.
For example, in classical mechanics, the current state of a particle allows for
predicting its trajectory. Since points in a phase space completely determine
classical states, it follows that all we need to know about a physical system
is encoded in that space. Therefore, a subset of this space can represent any
classical system’s property: having a specific value of energy can be represented
by the set of points in phase space that make the property actual. Suppose
there is an epistemic uncertainty about a state. In that case, this uncertainty
can be represented by probability measures over some particular subsets of phase
space, namely, measurable subsets, usually taken to be the Borel sets. Thus,
once the state of a system is known, its membership in the Borel set determines
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a proposition’s truth-value. If a probabilistic description is given, the state
determines the likelihood of any potential property.
Things are quite different for quantum systems. A quantum system’s pure
state is not a point in phase space but a ray in a Hilbert space. This means
that properties should be associated with rays or, more generally, with linear
combinations of them, generating subspaces in the Hilbert space. This approach
–and the study of the differences with classical mechanics– was systematically
studied by Birkhoff and von Neumann in [1]. They found that its Hilbert space’s
closed subspaces can naturally represent a quantum system’s elementary propo-
sitions. The main difference between quantum and classical propositions is that,
while the latter form a distributive lattice, the former does not. This algebraic
structure was called quantum logic, due to its analogies to propositional calcu-
lus. Thus, while states of a classical probabilistic model can be represented as
probability measures on the Boolean algebra of subsets of a phase space, the
states of quantum systems can be described as measures over the quantum logic
formed by the closed subspaces of its associated Hilbert space H. Let us call
this non-Boolean lattice L(H). Mathematically, L(H) is formed by all possible
closed subspaces of the Hilbert space (equivalently, by its orthogonal projec-
tions). Conceptually, each element of L(H) represents an elementary property
of the quantum system. Each of these elementary properties gives place to a
YES-NO experiment, that tests whether the system has the property or not.
These are called elementary tests. As an example, consider the property “the
system has spin up in direction ẑ”. An elementary test, is an experiment that
gives the answer “YES” if the system is detected to have spin up, and the answer
“NO” otherwise.
The peculiar non-Boolean mathematical structure associated with the proba-
bilistic quantum description of nature has its counterpart in the non-commutative
algebraic character of quantum observables, represented by self-adjoint opera-
tors acting on a separable Hilbert space. By appealing to the spectral theorem,
von Neumann successfully connected self-adjoint operators with the closed sub-
spaces representing yes-no experiments. Indeed, for each maximal set S of com-
patible quantum observables defining a concrete measurement context, there
exists a maximal Boolean subalgebra ΣS of L(H), representing the events of
a classical probability space associated to that context. Any quantum state
defines a classical probability space when combined with ΣS. Notice that an
important way of mathematically describing the quantum observables is by ap-
pealing to the notion of partial Abelian algebra. Intuitively, this means that
observables bear a compatibility relation among them: some of them commute
(when they are compatible), but in general, they will not commute.
The Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem [2] exploits the fact that quantum ob-
servables form a partial Abelian algebra and is one of the fundamental no-go
theorems in quantum theory. The KS theorem was conceived initially to discard
specific families of hidden-variable models. Its consequences were far-reaching
in the literature on the interpretation of the quantum formalism (see, for ex-
ample, the discussion in [3]). It can be extended to many probabilistic models
of interest [4, 5, 6], so its applicability domain goes far beyond standard quan-
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tum mechanics. The study of contextual systems outside the quantum domain
[7, 8, 9, 10] can be related to the interpretation of the KS result.
The KS theorem imposes severe restrictions on the possible valuations that
can be defined over the propositions associated with quantum systems. In this
work, we discuss the assumptions that underlie the KS contradiction at the
ontological level. In particular, we focus on the role played by the identity of
quantum objects. As is well known, quantum indistinguishability [11] poses a
severe threat to the assumption that quantum systems are individuals in the tra-
ditional sense (as billiard balls are). The peculiar behavior of quantum systems
regarding the impossibility of labeling or identifying them leads many authors
to conclude that quantum systems of the same kind are utterly indistinguishable
and that they cannot be considered as individuals at all. This leads to the idea
of developing an ontology based on non-individuals, which are genuinely indistin-
guishable objects that cannot be identified, and for which the standard theory of
identity does not apply (see for example, [12, 13]). In this work, we discuss the
implications of the assumption that quantum systems are non-individuals for
deriving the Kochen-Specker contradiction (abbreviated as “KS contradiction”,
in what follows). See also [14, 15, 16] for more discussion on this.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing some elementary
facts about probabilities in quantum and classical theories in Section 2. In
section 3, we review the KS contradiction. Then, in Section 4, we present a
discussion about quantum particles’ indistinguishability and establish the main
features of an ontology based on non-individuals. In Section 5, we show how
the assumptions about quantum systems’ identity are used in the KS argument.
Finally, in Section 6, we draw our conclusions.
2 Quantum States and the lattice of proposi-
tions of physical systems
In this section, we give some elementary technical definitions needed to under-
stand the Kochen-Specker contradiction.
2.1 Classical probabilities
It will be important for us to first recall how probabilities are defined in a
classical setting. Given a set Ω, let us consider a σ-algebra Σ ⊆ P(Ω) of subsets
of it. Then, a probability measure will be given by a function
µ : Σ→ [0, 1] (1)
satisfying the following axioms.
1. µ(∅) = 0





A µ in (1) satisfying axioms 1 and 2 is very useful since it captures the gen-
eral features of probabilities in many examples of interest. Probabilities defined
by (1) are usually called Kolmogorovian [17]. In order to fix ideas, let us con-
sider the concrete example of a dice. Each possible outcome can be represented
by an element of the set Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Let P(Ω) represent all possible
subsets of Ω. Before throwing the dice, consider the event “the outcome is
even.” It is naturally represented by the subset {2, 4, 6}. Alternatively, “the
outcome is greater than 3” is represented by {4, 5, 6}. Similarly, any possible
event can be represented as a subset of P(Ω) (in this example, the σ-algebra
Σ is equal to P(Ω)). A probability measure µ assigns a real number to each
member of P(Ω), in such a way that the rules listed above are satisfied. The
uniform probability is defined by the condition µ({i}) = 1
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, for i = 1, ..., 6. Nev-
ertheless, other measures can be considered (in order to represent, for example,
loaded dices). One key feature of Σ is that it is a Boolean algebra (as can be
straightforwardly checked for P(Ω) in the dice example). This means that, in
Σ, we can form conjunctions (given by set-theoretical intersections), disjunc-
tions (set-theoretical unions), and complements (set-theoretical complements),
and that these logical operations satisfy some specific algebraic properties. In
particular, the fact that Σ is a Boolean algebra implies that there will always
exist deterministic valuations: a function µ(P ) ∈ {0, 1}, assigning truth values
for all P ∈ P(Ω) (and satisfying axioms 1). Geometrically speaking, all possible
probabilistic states form a convex set with the uniform probability lying in its
centroid, and deterministic assignments (i.e., classical truth value assignments)
can be represented as its extreme points.
2.2 Quantum probabilities and observables
During the ’30s, Birkhoff and von Neumann studied the propositional structures
associated with quantum systems and compared them to classical systems. This
study gave birth to a mathematical structure known as quantum logic [1]. Ac-
cording to the quantum logical approach, an elementary experiment associated
with a quantum system is given by a yes-no test, i.e., a test in which we get the
answer “YES” or the answer “NO” [18], and it is mathematically represented
by a closed subspace of the Hilbert space. Conceptually, each elementary test,
does the job of testing whether the system has a certain property or not. Thus,
to each family of equivalent elementary tests (i.e., experiments that test the
same physical property), we can assign an elementary property of the system
involved.
In order to illustrate this, let us consider an example. Suppose that a quan-
tum system has a Hamiltonian H , and we are interested in testing whether the
system has energy value ǫ or not. If the system is prepared in an eigenstate |ψ〉,
i.e., H |ψ〉 = ǫ|ψ〉, then the probability of obtaining ǫ after measuring its energy
is one. In that sense, the state |ψ〉 makes the proposition “the system has energy
ǫ” true, and we say that the system possesses the property described by that
proposition. Any other eigenvector of H with eigenvalue ǫ does the same, as
well as any linear combination of them. Thus, we see that the closed subspace
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Sǫ – spanned by all eigenstates with eigenvalue ǫ – can be used to represent the
property “the system has energy ǫ.” Equivalently, one can use the projection
operator Pǫ associated to Sǫ, given the fact that closed spaces and orthogonal
projections are in a one to one correspondence. In the following, remember that
an operator P ∈ B(H) is said to be an orthogonal projection if it is self-adjoint
and satisfies P 2 = P .
Denote by B(H) the set of bounded operators acting on H and let P(H) be
the set of all orthogonal projections acting on H. It is possible to show that
P(H) can be endowed with an orthocomplemented lattice structure L(H) =
〈P(H), ∧, ∨, ¬, 0, 1〉, where P ∧ Q is the orthogonal projection associated
with the intersection of the ranges of P and Q, P∨Q is the orthogonal projection
associated with the closure of the direct sum of the ranges of P and Q, 0 is the
null operator (the bottom element of the lattice), 1 is the identity operator
(the top element), and ¬(P ) is the orthogonal projection associated with the
orthogonal complement of the range of P [19]. Alike the Boolean algebras used
in classical probabilistic models, P(H) is a non-Boolean lattice. It is always
modular in the finite-dimensional case and never modular in the infinite one
[19].
In quantum mechanics, states can be considered as functions that assign
probabilities to the elements of L(H). A state on a quantum system is repre-
sented by a function [20, 21]:
µ : L(H) −→ [0, 1] (2)
satisfying:
1. µ(0) = 0.




Gleason’s theorem [22, 23] implies that whenever dim(H) ≥ 3, the convex
set C(L(H)) of all measures of the form (2) can be put in a one to one corre-
spondence with the set S(H) of all positive and trace-class operators of trace
one acting in H. The correspondence is such that for every measure µ satisfying
the above axioms, there exists a density operator ρµ ∈ S(H) such that for every
orthogonal projector P representing an elementary test, we have
µ(P ) = tr(ρµP ). (3)
In quantum mechanics, any observable quantity can be represented by a self-
adjoint operator. For every self-adjoint operator A, if the system is prepared in
the state ρ, its mean value is given by the formula
〈A〉 = tr(ρA). (4)
Due to the spectral theorem, the set of all self-adjoint operators can be put
in one–one correspondence with projective valued measures (PVM) [24]. Let
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B(R) be the Borel set of the real line. Given a self-adjoint operator A, its
projection-valued measure MA is a map [19]
MA : B(R) 7→ P(H), (5)
such that
1. MA(∅) = 0
2. MA(R) = 1
3. MA(∪j(Bj)) =
∑
jMA(Bj), for any mutually disjoint family Bj
4. MA(B
c) = 1−MA(B) = (MA(B))⊥.
Propositions about the observable A are naturally represented by Borel subsets
of R. Given ∆ ∈ B(R), w can always associate a unique proposition “the value
of A lies in ∆.” Thus, MA connects the propositions about A with the prop-
erties of the quantum system, represented Hilbert space’s closed subspaces (or,
equivalently, with the orthogonal projections). Several significant consequences
follow from this association.
First, it is straightforward to show that the range of MA is a Boolean subal-
gebra ΣA of L(H). This implies that each observable defines a classical propo-
sitional system, in a similar way as we described in the example of the dice
presented in Section 2.1. When we consider a maximal observable (specified by
a measurement context), the corresponding Boolean subalgebra is maximal [18].
For example, a non-degenerate observable of a six-dimensional quantum system
defines an outcome space formally equivalent to that of a dice. These consider-
ations imply that quantum observables define classical random variables when
considered in connection to their respective measurement contexts. Notice that
a quantum state defines a classical probability for each measurement context.
In terms of the “dice example”, each measurement context behaves as a loaded
dice, with the probabilities fioxed by the global quantum state.
Second, the collection of all possible propositions –represented by L(H)–
can be described as a pasted family of (maximal) Boolean algebras. All possible
properties associated with a given quantum system can be grouped in differ-
ent Boolean algebras, representing the different measurement contexts. Two
properties are compatible if and only if they can be included in a common
Boolean algebra (i.e., tested in the same measurement context). This com-
patibility connection gives place to the mathematical notion of partial Boolean
algebra. Furthermore, the different Boolean algebras are such that they share
things in common. For example, in a two-parties scenario, the observable A⊗B
will not commute with A ⊗ C, whenever [B,C] 6= 0. However, the observable
A⊗ I commutes with A⊗B and A⊗ C. Thus, we find the same observable in
different measurement contexts. This means that quantum contexts define in-
tertwined Boolean algebras. Moreover, in general, the intertwining will be very
complex (and difficult to characterize). This means that L(H), the collection
of all possible elementary quantum properties, can be considered as a pasting
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of intertwined Boolean algebras. As we will see in the following section, the
fact that the different measurement contexts (or maximal Boolean subalgebras)
share common elements lies at the core of the KS contradiction.
3 Kochen-Specker theorem
In this section, we review the KS theorem [2, 5, 6]. It depends critically on the
non-Boolean character of L(H) described in the previous section. Kochen and
Specker aimed to study the possibility of finding hidden variables for quantum
mechanics. They focused on a very particular family of hidden-variable models.
Namely, they took as a model the relationship between classical statistical me-
chanics and thermodynamics. As a result of their research, it turns out that no
hidden-variable theory of this sort can exist for the quantum case.
In classical statistical mechanics, there is a hidden (i.e., non-observable) state
space Ω possessing micro-states λ ∈ Ω, and there exists a probability distribu-
tion p(λ) (that defines the probabilistic state of the system). For each macro-




fA(λ)p(λ)dλ. In other words, the values of macroscopic observ-
ables can be computed as mean values of random variables defined over Ω using
the usual probabilistic formulas. Notice that each λ ∈ Ω assigns a value vA to
each observable A according to the formula vλ(A) = fA(λ). And this assign-
ment is such that a functional condition is satisfied in the following sense: the
value assigned to a function of an observable is given by the function evaluated
in the value of the given observable. In formulae, this condition reads
B = G(A) =⇒ vλ(B) = g(vλ(A)) (6)
for all λ ∈ Ω, where G : A −→ A is a Borel function that maps observables in
observables, and by vλ(B) = g(vλ(A)), we mean a map g : R −→ R with the
same functional form as G. As an example, if B = A2, then vλ(B) = vλ(A)
2
(if vλ(A) = 2, then vλ(B) = 4). This condition is usually called FUNC in the
literature (see for example [25]), and it expresses the fact that observables are not
all independent, and neither are the values assigned to them. Hidden variables
satisfying the FUNC condition are the reasonable candidates for Kochen and
Specker. Thus, they look for hidden variables satisfying the FUNC condition,
and such that




for every quantum observable A and every quantum state ρ. Notice that each
quantum state ρ has its counterpart in the classical probability distribution pρ.
Let us now study with more detail how the hidden variables –assumed to
exist– should assign values to the observables. Let A(H) be the set of all self-
adjoint operators acting on the Hilbert space H. Any λ ∈ Ω defines a valuation
function vλ : A(H) −→ R, by appealing to the assignment vλ(A) = fA(λ). A
function such as vλ can be called a prediction function (see section II in [2]),
because it assigns a given value to each quantum observable.
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Let us see how this works for elementary properties represented by pro-
jection operators (see also sections I and II in [2]). As is well known, two
quantum mechanical observables represented by self-adjoint operators A and
B, respectively, are compatible, if and only if, there exist Borel functions g1
and g2, and a self adjoint operator C, such that A = g1(C) and B = g2(C).
Thus, whenever A and B are compatible, using the functionality condition
(6) we have vλ(AB) = vλ(g1(C)g2(C)) = vλ((g1g2)(C)) = (g1g2)(vλ(C)) =
g1(vλ(C))g2(vλ(C)) = vλ(g1(C))vλ(g2(C)) = vλ(A)vλ(B). If α and β are
real numbers, we also have, for compatible A and B, that vλ(αA + βB) =
vλ(αg1(C)+βg2(C)) = vλ((αg1+βg2)(C)) = (αg1+βg2)(vλ(C)) = αg1(vλ(C))+
βg2(vλ(C)) = αvλ(g1(C))+βvλ(g2(C)) = αvλ(A)+βvλ(B). It follows that, for
each λ ∈ Ω, vλ defines a partial Abelian algebra homomorphism. Further-
more, if P 2 = P and P † = P (i.e., if P is an orthogonal projection), we have
vλ(P ) = vλ(P
2) = vλ(P )vλ(P ) = vλ(P )
2, and then, fP = 0 or fP = 1. In
words: each hidden state assigns an homomorphism vλ : L(H) −→ {0, 1}. This
means that vλ assigns truth values (0 or 1) to each proposition in L(H) in a
functional way (see [26] for the technical meaning of “functional”). Let us il-
lustrate how this last condition (and 6) work in a given measurement context.
Every measurement context can be represented by a maximal collection {Pi} of
mutually orthogonal (i.e., PiPj = 0, whenever i 6= j) one dimensional projection
operators, that form a resolution of the identity
∑
i
Pi = 1 (8)
Then, it is easy to check that
∑
i
vλ(Pi) = 1 (9)
Notice that the above equation, implies that, if in a given measurement context
vλ(Pi) = 1, then, vλ(Pj) = 0, for j 6= i). Thus, we arrive at the conclusion
that, if hidden variables satisfying FUNC and 7 exist, there should also exist
valuations v : L(H) −→ {0, 1} having the property that ∑i v(Pi) = 1 for
any family {Pi}i∈N of one dimensional orthogonal elements of L(H) satisfying∑
i Pi = 1. But Kochen and Specker show that this is impossible. In order
to see why, let us consider a simple example (presented in [27]) of why such
valuations cannot exist.
Consider a four dimensional quantum model and the following nine measure-
ment contexts:
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P̂0,0,0,1 + P̂0,0,1,0 + P̂1,1,0,0 + P̂1,−1,0,0 = 1̂ (10)
P̂0,0,0,1 + P̂0,1,0,0 + P̂1,0,1,0 + P̂1,0,−1,0 = 1̂
P̂1,−1,1,−1 + P̂1,−1,−1,1 + P̂1,1,0,0 + P̂0,0,1,1 = 1̂
P̂1,−1,1,−1 + P̂1,1,1,1 + P̂1,0,−1,0 + P̂0,1,0,−1 = 1̂
P̂0,0,1,0 + P̂0,1,0,0 + P̂1,0,0,1 + P̂1,0,0,−1 = 1̂
P̂1,−1,−1,1 + P̂1,1,1,1 + P̂1,0,0,−1 + P̂0,1,−1,0 = 1̂
P̂1,1,−1,1 + P̂1,1,1,−1 + P̂1,−1,0,0 + P̂0,0,1,1 = 1̂
P̂1,1,−1,1 + P̂−1,1,1,1 + P̂1,0,1,0 + P̂0,1,0,−1 = 1̂
P̂1,1,1,−1 + P̂−1,1,1,1 + P̂1,0,0,1 + P̂0,1,−1,0 = 1̂,
Each equation above represents a different measurement context. For exam-
ple, in the first line, we have a complete observable with four possible outcomes,
represented by the projection operators P̂0,0,0,1, P̂0,0,1,0, P̂1,1,0,0 and P̂1,−1,0,0
(the subindexes represent the coordinates of rays in the Hilbert space). But the
one-dimensional projections are chosen so that each one of them is repeated in
different lines, something that is closely related to what we have discussed in
section 2.2 about the intertwining of contexts. The repeated projections are
painted with the same color in 10. Assuming the existence of a functional valu-
ation to the set {0, 1} satisfying 9, we reach a contradiction (see [27] for details).
This is so because, by summing-up all the valuations of the equations in 10, since
each projection is repeated twice, we obtain an even number in the left, but an
odd number in the right, and that can never be an equality! The intertwining
is responsible for the contradiction if the values assigned to each property are
preserved among the different contexts. In other words, in order to reach the
contradiction, we must assume that P̂0,0,0,1 in the first line of 10 is the same as
P̂0,0,0,1 when considered in the second line, and thus, that it retains its value
assignment among the different contexts. A similar consideration holds for the
remaining properties listed in 10.
Thus, we see that an implicit assumption behind the KS contradiction is
that the quantum system can be identified among the different contexts. Thus,
its properties must retain the value assignments given by the hidden parameters
λ. Is it legitimate to make these identifications? Can quantum systems be truly
identified? We will elaborate on this remark in section 5, after discussing the
problem of quantum indistinguishability in the next section.
4 Quantum Indistinguishability
The symmetrization postulate is an independent postulate of standard QM [11,
28]. When we consider two quantum systems that are of the same kind, we
must impose a symmetrization condition in their states. It turns out that, at the
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fundamental level, only two possibilities are experimentally observed. Either the





(|a〉 ⊗ |b〉+ |b〉 ⊗ |a〉)← (Bosons), (11)




(|a〉 ⊗ |b〉 − |b〉 ⊗ |a〉)← (Fermions). (12)
The symmetrization postulate and its consequences have been empirically
tested with great accuracy. It is a purely quantum feature –that has to be
added to entanglement and superposition– and it gives place to quantum statis-
tics. As a result, the permutation of two quantum systems of the same kind
gives no physical difference. In turn, this implies that quantum systems can-
not be consistently identified (and re-identified in time) [11]. These unusual
physical features were quickly recognized as a problematic aspect concerning
the assumption that quantum systems are individuals [13]. The Nobel laureate
physicist Erwin Schrödinger stated this point emphatically:
“I mean this: that the elementary particle is not an individual; it
cannot be identified, it lacks ‘sameness’. The fact is known to every
physicist, but is rarely given any prominence in surveys readable by
nonspecialists. In technical language it is covered by saying that
the particles ‘obey’ a new fangled statistics, either Einstein-Bose or
Fermi-Dirac statistics. [...] The implication, far from obvious, is
that the unsuspected epithet ‘this’ is not quite properly applicable
to, say, an electron, except with caution, in a restricted sense, and
sometimes not at all.” ([12], p.197)
In this way, Shrödinger points his finger towards an alternative ontology with
regards to individuality:
“[We are] compelled to dismiss the idea that (. . . ) a particle is an
individual entity which retains its “sameness” forever. Quite on the
contrary, we are now obliged to assert that the ultimate constituents
of matter have no “sameness” at all. I beg to emphasize this and
I beg you to believe it: It is not a question of our being able to
ascertain the identity in some instances and not being able to do
so in others. It is beyond of doubt that the question “sameness” or
“identity”, really and truly has no meaning.” ([12], p.197)
Indistinguishability is a distinctive physical feature of quantum mechanical
systems, and we emphasize that it is an independent postulate of standard QM,
different from entanglement. There can be disentangled indistinguishable sys-
tems, and there can be entangled systems that are perfectly distinguishable.
Indistinguishability lies behind superconductivity and Bose-Einstein condensa-
tion. With the advent of quantum information theory, it was quickly recognized
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as a technological resource [29, 30, 31, 32]. Thus, indistinguishability (or non-
individuality) is a concept that leads to a positive physical principle. It allows
physicists to conceive new physics, and it can be used to develop technological
devices (e.g., as a resource in quantum information theory). Thus, why not take
it seriously, at the ontological level? There are alternative interpretations (i.e.,
Bohmian mechanics) in which particles are explicit individual entities. How-
ever, it is also interesting to explore other possibilities that are close to common
practice in physics and explore the assumption that there are, in nature, objects
that are different solo numero and that cannot be identified, as Schrödinger sug-
gested. Here, we explore the implications of non-individuality for the discussion
about the KS contradiction.
5 KS contradiction and identity
In this section, we discuss the role of quantum systems’ identity in the derivation
of the KS contradiction. Before entering the KS case, we will discuss the EPR
example to motivate our point.
5.1 Identity in the EPR argument
In the famous EPR argument [33], a bipartite system is assumed to be prepared
in an entangled state. The authors adopt the following line of thought. Alice
and Bob are two physicists working in labs that are far apart from each other.
They each observe a particle arriving in their lab simultaneously (in a reference
frame at rest with respect to Alice and Bob’s labs).
• Step 1: Alice is free to decide if she measures position or momentum in
her system. Both measurements are mutually incompatible; they define
different measurement contexts and cannot be performed simultaneously.
• Step 2: If Alice decides to measure position, she can infer that Bob’s
system possesses a defined position. Once Alice’s result is given, it is also
possible to predict Bob’s result with certainty. Then, according to the
EPR reality criteria, Bob’s system’s position is an element of reality, given
that the systems are very far away, and there cannot be any mechanical
disturbance due to Alice’s measurement. A similar consideration follows
if Alice decides to measure momentum in her system.
• Step 3: By identifying the results of the two (mutually exclusive) possi-
bilities of measurement, it follows that both magnitudes must be elements
of reality. Furthermore, since both refer to Bob’s particle, they must be
elements of reality simultaneously.
The authors of the EPR paper are very clear about the act of identification.
They say that “...it is possible to assign two different wave functions (in our
example ψm and φr) to the same reality (the second system after the interaction
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with the first)” [33]. They refer to Bob’s particle, when considered in two
different measurement contexts, as “the same reality”. In this way, they assume
that the quantum system can be identified among the different contexts. If this
were true, quantum mechanics would be incomplete, as they correctly conclude.
However, one may ask: are quantum systems identifiable? This problem is
widely studied in the philosophy of logic. The notion of transmundane identity -
“identity between possible worlds” - is the notion that the same object exists in
more than one possible world (with the real world treated as one of the possible
worlds). Therefore, one has one’s home in a framework of “possible worlds” to
analyze, or at least paraphrase, statements about what is possible or necessary
[34].
The issue of transmundane identity has been highly controversial, even
among philosophers who accept the legitimacy of speaking of possible worlds.
Opinions range from viewing the notion of an identity held between objects in
different possible worlds as so problematic, that it is unacceptable to viewing the
notion as entirely innocuous, and no more problematic than the claim that ob-
jects individuals could have existed with somewhat different properties. Things
are complicated by the fact that an important rival for “transmundane identity”
has been proposed: David Lewis’s [35, 36] counterpart theory. In this theory,
the claim that an individual exists in more than one possible world replaces the
claim that although each individual exists in only one world, it has counterparts
in other worlds, where the counterpart relationship (based on similarity) does
not satisfy the logic of identity. Therefore, much of the discussion in this area
has concerned the comparative merits of transmundane identity and the theo-
retical explanations of the counterpart as interpretations, within a framework
of possible worlds, of statements of what is possible and necessary for private
individuals. Usually, the identity of physical systems is taken for granted. More
so, if we consider that, in standard quantum mechanics, the symmetrization pos-
tulate is an independent axiom, and one can discuss many particular physical
phenomena (such as superpositions and entanglement) without taking it into
account. However, the whole theory must be taken into account in discussions
about ontology.
This analysis illustrates that we must consider quantum indistinguishability
in the discussions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics. One either
assumes, as in Bohmian mechanics, that quantum systems are individuals or
one does not. If quantum systems are assumed to be non-individuals, then they
cannot be identified in general. In particular, they cannot be identified when
considered in different contexts. If we assume an ontology of non-individuals,
the EPR argument is not entailed!
Identifying items (systems, properties, beables) among different (and mutu-
ally exclusive) possible worlds is problematic in general. For example, it would
not be meaningful to identify the USA in our current world with a country in
the alternative world of Phillip K. Dick’s novel, where the Axis won WWII. One
can compare both countries, the actual one, and the hypothetical one. However,
it is meaningless to try to identify them. Identification among different con-
texts is even more problematic when systems are non-individuals, in the sense
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suggested by Schrodinger for quantum systems.
5.2 The different steps that lead to the KS contradiction
Let us go back again to the origin of the KS contradiction. One can identify the
following steps:
• Hidden variables are assumed assigning values to the different observables
(represented by the self-adjoint operators in A(H)).
• The values are assigned in so that they are context independent. This
means that the same λ defines the state of a single quantum system, and
assigns the same value vλ(A) to each observable A, independently of the
context in which it is considered. In other words, the system is assumed
to retain its identity among the different contexts.
• Something similar happens with projection operators representing elemen-
tary properties: properties (with the same content) appearing in different
contexts are identified, and their truth values are preserved.
• The above assumptions lead to the conclusion that there should exist a
valuation from L(H) to the two-valued Boolean algebra, satisfying the
functionality condition 9. However, no such valuation exists.
As we have seen in section 4, the assumption that quantum systems can be
identified (and consistently re-identified) is problematic. This problem was also
illustrated in the EPR example. As we can see, it is clear that an identification
procedure is taken to derive the KS contradiction: the system is considered the
same among the different contexts, and properties are concomitantly identified.
Let us now analyze the KS discussion under the metaphysical assumption
that quantum systems are non-individuals. We can summarize the assumption
leading to the KS contradiction as the following statement.
(KSH) It is possible to assign context-independent and well-defined
values to all measurable properties of a single quantum system.
After what we have said above, it should be clear that we can avoid the KS
contradiction by negating KSH in at least two ways.
(i) Properties do not have well-defined context-independent truth values.
(ii) Properties or particles may be indistinguishable (due to the possibility that
they are non-individuals).
The conclusion given by (i) is the most popular in the foundations of quan-
tum mechanics. It is the usual way to avoid the KS contradiction, as discussed
in Section 3. Similarly, it is argued that hidden variable theories, if they assign
values to a quantum system’s defining properties, must be contextual. How-
ever, we also have the second option. It may well be that option (ii) is true:
13
if particles are truly indistinguishable entities, there is no way to identify the
particles when considered in the different measurement contexts. Furthermore,
this might have consequences for the measurement process: the intrinsic lack
of particles’ identity makes it meaningless to speak about properties as being
properties of a specific particle. We think that these observations open the door
to a novel interpretation of the KS result.
Under the non-individuality assumption, it seems odd to affirm that the
properties defining a context C correspond to the same particle than the ones
defining a “different” context D prepared in the same way (an indistinguishable
context, in the sense posed before). The act of choosing between measurements
in contexts C or D corresponds to different (and usually incompatible) possible
worlds. We cannot concede that we are talking about the same object (“the
same reality”, as in the EPR argument) underlying these alternatives: our non-
individuality assumption implies that it is meaningless to assign a transworld
identity to elementary particles. Notice that this argument needs not to be op-
erational: it follows as a logical consequence of our ontological non-individuality
assumption. There is no need to perform any actual experiments to realize that
to affirm that we have the same particle in all contexts is a strong ontological
assumption (dependent on the classical notion of identity).
6 Conclusions
In this work, we have shown that one of the leading metaphysical assumptions
behind the KS contradiction’s derivation is that the systems are (covertly) con-
sidered individuals who can be identified among the different measurement con-
texts. Consequently, it follows that properties retain their values because we are
speaking about the same physical system. Obviously, a similar analysis holds
for most KS-like contradictions (a matter that we will tackle in future works).
However, as we have seen, if one takes earnestly quantum indistinguishability,
it seems that one cannot so calmly assume that quantum systems are individuals.
At the very least, one must be explicit about this assumption and consider
it when extracting ontological conclusions. Consequently, when we consider
different measurement contexts, it is not clear that we are speaking about the
same system. Of course, this is an interpretation-dependent issue since there are
interpretations in which quantum systems are indeed individuals. We believe
that considering explicitly an ontology in which quantum systems are truly
indistinguishable entities –in the sense of Schrödinger– the previous discussions
about interpretation –as we have shown for the case in the EPR argument–
provides an attractive perspective for ontological research. This perspective has
the potential of being more attuned to the views of the physics community.
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